THE ART OF LOGICAL THINKING/PART 6
CHAPTER VI.
TERMS
In
logic the words concept and term are
practically identical, but in the popular usage of the terms there is a
distinct difference. This difference is warranted, if we depart from the
theoretical phase of logic, for the word concept really
denotes an idea in the mind, while the word term really
denotes a word or name of an idea or concept—the symbol of the
latter. In a previous chapter we have seen that Denomination, or "the act
of naming or designating by a name" is the final step or stage in forming
a concept. And it is a fact that the majority of the words in the languages of
civilized people denote general ideas or concepts. As Brooks says: "To
give each individual or particular idea a name peculiar to itself would be
impracticable and indeed impossible; the mind would soon become overwhelmed
with its burden of names. Nearly all the ordinary words of our language are
general rather than particular. The individuals distinguished by
particular names, excepting persons and places, are comparatively few. Most
objects are named only by common nouns; nearly all of our verbs express general
actions; our adjectives denote common qualities, and our adverbs designate
classes of actions and qualities. There are very few words in the language,
besides the names of persons and places, that do not express general
ideas."
In
logic the word term is employed to denote any word or
words which constitute a concept. The word concept is
employed strictly in the sense of a subject of thought, without
reference to the words symbolizing it. The concept, or subject of
thought, is the important element or fact and the term denoting
it is merely a convenient symbol of expression. It must be remembered that
a term does not necessarily consists of but a single word, for
often many words are employed to denote the concept, sometimes even an entire
clause or phrase being found necessary for the current term. For
the purpose of the consideration of the subjects to be treated upon in this
book, we may agree that: A term is the outward symbol of a concept;
and that: The concept is the idea expressed by the term.
There
are three general parts or phases of Deductive Logic, namely: Terms,
Propositions and Syllogisms. Therefore, in considering Terms we are entering
into a consideration of the first phase of Deductive Logic. Unless we have a
correct understanding of Terms, we cannot expect to understand the succeeding
stages of Deductive Reasoning. As Jevons says: "When we join terms
together we make a Proposition; when we join Propositions together, we make an
argument or piece of reasoning.... We should generally get nothing but nonsense
if we were to put together any terms and any propositions and to suppose that
we were reasoning. To produce a good argument we must be careful to obey
certain rules, which it is the purpose of Logic to make known. But, in order to
understand the matter perfectly, we ought first to learn exactly what a
term is, and how many kinds of terms there may be; we have next to learn
the nature of a proposition and the different kinds of propositions. Afterwards
we shall learn how one proposition may by reasoning be drawn from other
propositions in the kind of argument called the syllogism."
Now,
having seen that terms are the outward symbols or expression of concepts, and
are the names of things which we join together in a proposition, let us proceed
to consider the different kinds of terms, following the classifications adopted
by the authorities.
A term may
contain any number of nouns, substantive or adjective or it may contain but a
single noun. Thus in, "Tigers are ferocious," the first term is the
single substantive "tigers;" the second term is the single adjective
"ferocious." And in the proposition, "The King of England is the
Emperor of India," there are two terms, each composed of two nouns,
"King of England" being the first term and "Emperor of
India" being the second term. The proposition, "The library of the
British Museum is the greatest collection of books in the world," contains
fifteen words but only two terms; the first term being "The
library of the British Museum," in which are two substantives, one
adjective, two definite articles and one preposition; the second term being,
"the greatest collection of books in the world," which contains three
substantives, one adjective, two articles, and two prepositions. The above
illustration is supplied by Jevons, who adds: "A logical term, then, may
consist of any number of nouns, substantive or adjective, with the articles,
prepositions and conjunctions required to join them together; still it
is only one term if it points out, or makes us think of a single object, or
collection, or class of objects." (A substantive, is: "the part
of speech which expresses something that exists, either material or
immaterial.")
The
first classification of terms divides them into two general classes, viz.,
(1) Singular Terms; and (2) General Terms.
A Singular
Term is a term denoting a single object, person or thing. Although
denoting only a single object, person or thing, it may be composed of several
words; or it may be composed of but one word as in the case of a proper name,
etc. The following are Singular Terms, because they are terms denoting but a
single object, person or thing: "Europe; Minnesota; Socrates; Shakespeare;
the first man; the highest good; the first cause; the King of England; the
British Museum; the Commissioner of Public Works; the main street of the City
of New York." It will be noted that in all of the examples given, the
Singular Term denotes a particular something, a specific thing, a something of
which there is but one, and that one possesses particularity and individuality.
As Hyslop says: "Oneness of kind is not the only or
distinctive feature of Singular Terms, but individuality, or
singularity, as representing a concrete individual whole."
A General
Term is a term which applies, in the same sense, to each and every
individual object, person or thing in a number of objects, persons or things of
the same kind, or to the entire class composed of such objects persons or
things of the same kind. For instance, "horse; man; biped; mammal; trees;
figures; grain of sand; matter," etc. Hyslop says, regarding General
Terms: "In these instances the terms denote more than one object, and
apply to all of the same kind. Their meaning is important in the interpretation
of what are called universal propositions."
Another
general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes, as
follows: (1) Collective Terms; and (2) Distributive Terms. Hyslop says of this
classification: "This division is based upon the distinction between
aggregate wholes of the same kind and class terms. It partly coincides with the
division into Singular and General Terms, the latter always being
distributive."
A Collective
Term is one which denotes an aggregate or collected whole of objects,
persons or things of the same or similar kind, which collective whole
is considered as an individual, although composed of a totality of separate
individual objects, persons or things. Thus the following terms:
"regiment; congregation; army; family; crowd; nation; company; battalion;
class; congress; parliament; convention;" etc. are Collective Terms,
because they denote collective, aggregate or composite wholes, considered as an
individual.
A Distributive
Term is a term which denotes each and every individual object,
person or thing in a given class. For example, are the terms: "man;
quadruped; biped; mammal; book; diamond; tree." As Hyslop says:
"General terms are always distributive." Also: "It is
important also to keep clear the distinction between class wholes
and collective wholes.... They are often confused so as to
call a term denoting a class a Collective Term."
Another
general classification of Terms divides them into the following two respective
classes; (1) Concrete Terms; and (2) Abstract Terms.
A Concrete
Term is a term denoting either a definite object, person or thing
which is subject to perception and experience, and may be considered as
actually existent concretely, as for instance: horse; man; mountain; dollar;
knife; table; etc., or else an attribute thought of and used solely as an
attribute, as for instance: "beautiful, wise, noble, virtuous, good,"
etc.
An Abstract
Term is a term denoting the attribute, quality or property considered
as apart from the object, person or thing and as having an abstract
existence, as for instance: "beauty; wisdom; nobility; goodness;
virtue," etc. As we have seen elsewhere, these qualities have no real
existence in themselves, but are known and thought of only in
connection with concrete objects, persons and things. Thus we cannot know
"Beauty," but may know beautiful things; we cannot know
"Virtue," but we may know virtuous people, etc.
An attribute
or quality is concrete when expressed as an adjective;
and abstract when expressed as a noun; as for
instance, "beautiful" and "beauty," respectively, or
"virtuous" and "virtue," respectively. The distinction may
be summed up as follows: A Concrete Term is the name of a thing or of a
quality of a thing expressed as an adjective and as merely a quality; while
an Abstract Term is the name of a quality of a thing, expressed as a
noun and as a "thing" in itself.
Certain
terms may be used as either Concrete Terms or as Abstract Terms, and certain
authorities have seen fit to classify them as Mixed Terms, as for
instance the terms: "government; religion; philosophy;" etc.
Another
general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes as
follows: (1) Positive Terms; and (2) Negative Terms.
A Positive
Term is a term which denotes its own qualities, as for instance:
"good, human, large, square, black, strong," etc. These terms
indicate the presence of the quality denoted by the term itself.
A Negative
Term is a term denoting the absence of a quality, as for instance:
"inhuman, inorganic, unwell, unpleasant, non-conducive," etc. These
terms deny the presence of certain qualities, rather
than asserting the presence of an opposite quality. They are
essentially negative in nature and in form. Jevons says: "We may usually
know a Negative Term by its beginning with one of the little syllables un-,
in-, a-, an-, non-, or by its ending with -less." Hyslop says: "The
usual symbols of Negative Terms are in, un, less, dis, a,
or an, anti, mis, and sometimes de,
and non and not." Jevons adds: "If the
English language were a perfect one, every term ought to have a Negative Term
exactly corresponding to it, so that all adjectives and nouns would be in
pairs. Just as convenient has its negative inconvenient;
metallic, non-metallic; logical, illogical; and so on; so blue should have its
negative, non-blue; literary, non-literary; paper, non-paper. But many of these
Negative Terms would be seldom or never used, and if we happen to want
them, we can make them for the occasion by putting not-, or non-, before the
Positive Term. Accordingly, we find in the dictionary only those Negative Terms
which are much employed."
The
last named authority also says: "Sometimes the same word may seem to have
two or even more distinct negatives. There is much difference between undressed and not-dressed,
that is 'not in evening dress.' Both seem to be negatives of 'dressed,' but
this is because the word has two distinct meanings."
Some
authorities insist upon closer and further classification, as for instance, in
the case of what they call a Privative Term, denoting the absence
of qualities once possessed by the object, person or thing, as: "deaf,
dead, blind, dark," etc. Hyslop says that these terms "are Positive
in form and Negative in matter or meaning." Also in the case of what they
call a Nego-positive Term, denoting "the presence of a
positive quality expressed in a negative manner," as: disagreeable,
inhuman, invaluable, etc. These last mentioned classes however are regarded by
some as the result of "carrying too far" the tendency toward classification,
and the two general classes, Positive and Negative, are thought sufficient for
the purpose of the general student. The same objection applies to a
classification occasionally made i.e., that which is called
an Infinitated Term, denoting a term the intent of which is to
place in a distinct category every object, person or thing other than that
expressed in the corresponding Positive Term. The intent of the term is to
place the positive idea in one class, and all else into a separate one.
Examples of this class of terms are found in: "not-I, not-animal,
not-tree, unmoral," etc. Hyslop says of these terms: "They are not
always, if ever, recognized as rhetorically elegant, but are valuable often to
make clear the really negative, or infinitatively negative nature of the idea
in mind."
Another
general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes, as
follows: (1) Absolute Terms; and (2) Relative Terms.
An Absolute
Term is a term denoting the presence of qualities intrinsic to the
object, and not depending upon any relation to any other object, as for
instance: "man; book; horse; gun;" etc. These terms may
be related to many other terms, but are not necessarily related
to any other.
A Relative Term is a term
denoting certain necessary relations to other terms, as for
instance: "father; son; mother; daughter; teacher; pupil; master;
servant;" etc. Thus it is impossible to think of "child" except
in relation to "parent," or vice versa. The one term
implies the existence of its related term.
Hyslop
says of the above classification: "Relative Terms suggest the thought of
other individuals with the relation involved as a part of the term's meaning,
while Absolute Terms suggest only the qualities in the subject without a
relation to others being necessarily involved."
Some
authorities also classify terms as higher and lower; also as broad
and narrow. This classification is meant to indicate the content and extent
of the term. For instance, when we classify, we begin with the individuals
which we then group into a small class. These classes we then group into a
larger class, according to their resemblances. These larger classes then go to
form a part of still larger classes, and so on. As these classes advance
they form broader terms; and as we retreat from the general
class into the less general and more particular, the term becomes narrower.
By some, the broader term which includes the narrower is
called the higher term, and the narrower are called the lower
terms. Thus animal would be a higher and broader term than
dog, cat or tiger because it includes the latter. Brooks says: "Since a
concept is formed by the union of the common attributes of individuals, it thus
embraces both attributes and individuals. The attributes of a concept constitute
what is called its content; the individuals it embraces constitute
its extent."
Accordingly,
the feature of including objects in a concept or term is called its extension;
while the feature of including attributes or qualities is called its intension.
It follows as a natural consequence that the greater the extension of
a term, the less its intension; the greater its intension,
the less its extension. We will understand this more clearly when
we consider that the more individuals contained in a term, the fewer common properties
or qualities it can contain; and the more common properties, the fewer
individuals. As Brooks says: "The concept man has
more extension than poet, orator or statesman,
since it embraces more individuals; and less intension, since we
must lay aside the distinctive attributes of poet, orator and statesman in
order to unite them in a common class man." In the same way
the general term animal is quite extended for it includes a
large number of individual varieties of very different and varied
characteristics and qualities; as for instance, the lion, camel, dog, oyster,
elephant, snail, worm, snake, etc. Accordingly its intension must be small for
it can include only the qualities common to all animals, which are very few
indeed. The definition of the term shows how small is its intension,
as: "Animal. An organic being, rising above a vegetable in
various respects, especially in possessing sensibility, will and the power of
voluntary motion." Another narrows the intension still further when he
defines animal as: "a creature which possesses, or has
possessed, life." Halleck says: "Animal is very narrow in
intension, very broad in extension. There are few qualities common to all
animals, but there is a vast number of animals. To give the full meaning of the
term in extension, we should have to name every animal, from the
microscopic infusoria to the tiger, from the angleworm to the whale. When we
decrease the extension to one species of animal, horse, the
individuals are fewer, the qualities more numerous."
The
importance of forming clear and distinct concepts and of grouping, classifying
and generalizing these into larger and broader concepts and terms is recognized
by all authorities and is generally regarded as forming the real basis of all constructive
thought. As Brooks says: "Generalization lies at the basis of language:
only as man can form general conceptions is it possible for him to form a
language.... Nearly all the ordinary words in our language are general rather
than particular.... This power of generalization lies also at the basis of
science. Had we no power of forming general ideas, each particular object would
be a study by itself, and we should thus never pass beyond the very alphabet of
knowledge. Judgments, except in the simplest form, would be impossible; and it
is difficult to see how even the simplest form of the syllogism could be
constructed. No general conclusion could be drawn from particulars, nor
particular conclusions from generals; and thus neither inductive nor deductive
reasoning would be possible. The classifications of science could not be made;
and knowledge would end at the very threshold of science."
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