THE ART OF LOGICAL THINKING/PART 8
CHAPTER VIII.
JUDGMENTS
The
first step in the process of reasoning is that of Conception or the forming of
Concepts. The second step is that of Judgment, or the process of perceiving the
agreement or disagreement of two conceptions.
Judgment in
Logic is defined as: "The comparing together in the mind of two notions,
concepts or ideas, which are the objects of apprehension, whether complex or
incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree with each other, or that
one of them belongs or does not belong to the other. Judgment is therefore
affirmative or negative."
When
we have in our mind two concepts, we are likely to compare them one with the
other, and to thus arrive at a conclusion regarding their agreement or
disagreement. This process of comparison and decision is what, in Logic, is
called Judgment.
In
every act of Judgment there must be at least two concepts to be examined and
compared. This comparison must lead to a Judgment regarding their agreement or
disagreement. For instance, we have the two concepts, horse and animal.
We examine and compare the two concepts, and find that there is an agreement
between them. We find that the concept horse is included in
the higher concept of animal and therefore, we assert that:
"The horse is an animal." This is a statement of agreement and
is, therefore, a Positive Judgment. We then compare the
concepts horse and cow and find a
disagreement between them, which we express in the statement of the Judgment
that: "The horse is not a cow." This Judgment, stating a
disagreement is what is called a Negative Judgment.
In
the above illustration of the comparison between the concepts horse and animal we
find that the second concept animal is broader than the
first, horse, so broad in fact that it includes the latter. The
terms are not equal, for we cannot say, in truth, that "an animal is the
horse." We may, however, include a part of the broader
conception with the narrower and say: "some animals are horses."
Sometimes both concepts are of equal rank, as when we state that:
"Man is a rational animal."
In
the process of Judgment there is always the necessity of the choice between the
Positive and the Negative. When we compare the concepts horse and animal,
we must of necessity decide either that the horse is an
animal, or else that it is not an animal.
The
importance of the process of Judgment is ably stated by Halleck, as follows:
"Were isolated concepts possible, they would be of very little use.
Isolated facts are of no more service than unspun wool. We might have a concept
of a certain class of three-leaved ivy, as we might also of poisons. Unless
judgment linked these two concepts and decided that this species of ivy is
poisonous, we might take hold of it and be poisoned. We might have a concept of
bread and also one of meat, fruit and vegetables. If we also had a concept of
food, unrelated to these, we should starve to death, for we should not think of
them as foods. A vessel, supposing itself to be far out at sea, signaled
another vessel that the crew were dying of thirst. That crew certainly had a
concept of drinkable things and also of water. To the surprise of the
first, the second vessel signaled back, 'Draw from the sea and drink. You are
at the mouth of the Amazon.' The thirsty crew had not joined the concept drinkable to
the concept of water over the ship's side. A man having taken an overdose of
laudanum, his wife lost much valuable time in sending out for antidotes,
because certain of her concepts had not been connected by judgment. She had
good concepts of coffee and of mustard; she also knew that an antidote to opium
was needed; but she had never linked these concepts and judged that coffee and
mustard were antidotes to opium. The moment she formed that judgment she was a
wiser woman for her knowledge was related and usable.... Judgment is the power
revolutionizing the world. The revolution is slow because nature's forces are
so complex, so hard to be reduced to their simplest forms and so disguised and
neutralized by the presence of other forces.... Fortunately judgment is ever silently
working and comparing things that, to past ages, have seemed dissimilar; and it
is continually abstracting and leaving out of the field of view those
qualities which have simply served to obscure the point at issue.”
Judgment
may be both analytic or synthetic in its processes; and it may be neither. When
we compare a narrow concept with a broader one, as a part with a whole, the
process is synthetic or an act of combination. When we compare a part of a
concept with another concept, the process is analytic. When we compare concepts
equal in rank or extent, the process is neither synthetic nor analytic. Thus in
the statement that: "A horse is an animal," the judgment is
synthetic; in the statement that: "some animals are horses," the
judgement is analytic; in the statement that: "a man is a rational
animal," the judgment is neither analytic nor synthetic.
Brooks
says: "In one sense all judgments are synthetic. A judgment consists of
the union of two ideas and this uniting is a process of synthesis. This,
however, is a superficial view of the process. Such a synthesis is a mere
mechanical synthesis; below this is a thought-process which is sometimes
analytic, sometimes synthetic and sometimes neither analytic nor
synthetic."
The
same authority states: "The act of mind described is what is known
as logical judgment. Strictly speaking, however, every intelligent
act of the mind is accompanied with a judgment. To know is to
discriminate and, therefore, to judge. Every sensation or cognition involves a
knowledge and so a judgment that it exists. The mind cannot think at all
without judging; to think is to judge. Even in forming the notions
which judgment compares, the mind judges. Every notion or concept
implies a previous act of judgment to form it: in forming a concept, we compare
the common attributes before we unite them; and comparison is judgment. It is
thus true that 'Every concept is a contracted judgment; every judgment an
expanded concept.' This kind of judgment, by which we affirm the existence of
states of consciousness, discriminate qualities, distinguish percepts and form
concepts, is called primitive or psychological judgment."
In
Logical Judgment there are two aspects; i.e., Judgment by Extension
and Judgment by Intension. When we compare the two concepts horse and animal we
find that the concept horse is contained in the concept animal and
the judgment that "a horse is an animal" may be considered as
a Judgment by Extension. In the same comparison we see that the concept horse contains
the quality of animality, and in attributing this quality to
the horse, we may also say "the horse is an animal,"
which judgment may be considered as a Judgment by Intension. Brooks says:
"Both views of Judgment are correct; the mind may reach its judgment either
by extension or by intension. The method by extension is usually the more
natural."
When
a Judgment is expressed in words it is called a Proposition. There is some
confusion regarding the two terms, some holding that a Judgment and a
proposition are identical, and that the term "proposition" may be
properly used to indicate the judgment itself. But the authorities who seek for
clearness of expression and thought now generally hold that: "A
Proposition is a Judgment expressed in words." In the next chapter, in
which we consider Propositions, we shall enter into a more extended
consideration of the subject of Judgments as expressed in
Propositions, which consideration we omit at this point in order to avoid
repetition. Just as the respective subjects of Concepts and Terms necessarily
blend into each other, so do the respective subjects of Judgments and
Propositions. In each case, too, there is the element of the mental process on
the one hand and the verbal expression of it on the other hand. It will be well
to keep this fact in mind.
NEXT CHAPTER
Comments
Post a Comment