THOUGHT-CULTURE/PART 2
CHAPTER II.
THE NATURE OF THOUGHT
It was
formerly considered necessary for all books on the subject of thought to begin
by a recital of the metaphysical conceptions regarding the nature and
"thingness" of Mind. The student was led through many pages and
endless speculation regarding the metaphysical theories regarding the origin
and inner nature of Mind which, so far from establishing a fixed and definite
explanation in his mind, rather tended toward confusing him and giving him the
idea that psychology was of necessity a speculative science lacking the firm
practical basis possessed by other branches of science. In the end, in the
words of old Omar, he "came out the door through which he went."
But this
tendency has been overcome of late years, and writers on the subject pass by
all metaphysical conceptions regarding the nature of Mind, and usually begin by
plunging at once into the real business of psychology—the business of the
practical study of the mechanism and activities of the mind itself. As some
writer has said, psychology has no more concern with the solution of the
eternal riddle of "What is Mind?" than physics with the twin-riddle
of "What is Matter?" Both riddles, and their answers, belong to
entirely different branches and fields of thought than those concerned with
their laws of operation and principles of activity. As Halleck says:
"Psychology studies the phenomena of mind, just as physics investigates
those of matter." And, likewise, just as the science of physics holds true
in spite of the varying and changing conceptions regarding the nature of
matter, so does the science of psychology hold true in spite of the varying and
changing conceptions regarding the nature of Mind.
Halleck
has well said: "If a materialist should hold that the mind was nothing but
the brain, and that the brain was a vast aggregation of molecular sheep herding
together in various ways, his hypothesis would not change the fact that
sensation must precede perception, memory and thought; nor would the laws of
the association of ideas be changed, nor would the fact that interest and
repetition aid memory cease to hold good. The man who thought his mind was a
collection of little cells would dream, imagine, think and feel; so also would
he who believed his mind to be immaterial. It is very fortunate that the same
mental phenomena occur, no matter what theory is adopted. Those who like to
study the puzzles as to what mind and matter really are must go to metaphysics.
Should we ever find that salt, arsenic and all things else are the same
substance with a different molecular arrangement, we should still not use them
interchangeably."
For the
purposes of the study of practical psychology, we may as well lay aside, if
even for the moment, our pet metaphysical conceptions and act as if we knew
nothing of the essential nature of Mind (and indeed Science in truth does not know),
and confine ourselves to the phenomena and manifestations of Mind which, after
all, is the only way in which and by which we can know anything at all about
it. As Brooks says: "The mind can be defined only by its activities and
manifestations. In order to obtain a definition of the mind, therefore, we
must observe and determine its various forms of activity. These activities, classified
under a few general heads and predicated of the unseen something which
manifests them, will give us a definition of mind."
The act of
consciousness determines the existence of Mind in the person experiencing it.
No one can be conscious of thought and, at the same time, deny the existence of
mind within himself. For the very act of denial, in itself, is a manifestation
of thought and consequently an assertion of the existence of mind. One may
assert the axiom: "I think, therefore, I have a mind;" but he is denied
the privilege of arguing: "I think, therefore, I have no mind." The
mind has an ultimate and final knowledge of its own existence.
The older
view of Mind is that it is a something higher than matter which it uses for its
manifestation. It was held to be unknowable in itself and to be studied only
through its manifestations. It was supposed to involve itself, to become
involved, in some way in matter and to there manifest itself in an infinitude
of forms, degrees, and variations. The materialistic view, which arose
into prominence in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, held, on the contrary,
that Mind was merely an activity or property of Matter—a function of matter
akin to extension and motion. Huxley, voicing this conception said: "We
have no knowledge of any thinking substance apart from an extended
substance.... We shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of
consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of
heat." But, Huxley, himself, was afterwards constrained to acknowledge
that: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the jinnee when Aladdin
rubbed his lamp."
The most
advanced authorities of the day, are inclined to the opinion that both Matter
and Mind are both differing aspects of some one fundamental Something; or, as
some of the closest thinkers state it, both are probably two apparently
differing manifestations or emanations of an Underlying Something which, as
Spencer says: "transcends not only our reason but also our
imagination." The study of philosophy and metaphysics serves an important
purpose in showing us how much we do not know, and why we do not
know—also in showing us the fallacy of many things we had thought we did
know—but when it comes to telling us the real "why," actual cause, or
essential nature of anything, it is largely a disappointment to
those who seek fundamental truths and ultimate reasons. It is much more comfortable
to "abjure the 'Why' and seek the 'How'"—if we can.
Many
psychologists classify the activities of the mind into three general
divisions; viz., (1) Thinking; (2) Willing; (3) Feeling. These
divisions, which result from what is known as "the tri-logical
classification," were first distinctly enunciated by Upham although Kant
had intimated it very plainly. For many years before the favored division was
but two-fold the line of division being between the cognitive, or
knowing, activities, and the conative, or acting, activities,
generally known as the Understanding and the Will, respectively. It took a long
time before the authorities would formally recognize the great field of the
Feelings as forming a class by themselves and ranking with the Understanding
and the Will. There are certain sub-divisions and shadings, which we shall
notice as we proceed, some of which are more or less complex, and which seem to
shade into others. The student is cautioned against conceiving of the mind as a
thing having several compartments or distinct divisions. The classification
does not indicate this and is only intended as a convenience in analyzing and
studying the mental activities and operations. The "I" which feels,
thinks and acts is the same—one entity.
As Brooks
well says: "The mind is a self-conscious activity and not a mere
passivity; it is a centre of spiritual forces, all resting in the background of
the ego. As a centre of forces, it stands related to the forces of the material
and spiritual universe and is acted upon through its susceptibilities by those
forces. As a spiritual activity, it takes the impressions derived from those
forces, works them up into the organic growth of itself, converts them into
conscious knowledge and uses these products as means to set other forces into
activity and produce new results. Standing above nature and superior to its
surroundings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we may say, and transforms
material influences into spiritual facts akin to its own nature. Related to the
natural world and apparently originating from it, it yet rises above this
natural world and, with the crown of freedom upon its brow, rules the natural
obedient to its will."
In this
book, while we shall fully and unquestionably recognize the "tri-logical
classification" of the activities of the Mind into the divisions of
Thinking, Willing and Feeling, respectively, nevertheless, we shall, for
convenience, use the term "Thought" in its broadest, widest and most
general sense, as: "The power or faculty of thinking; the mental faculty;
the mind," rather than in its narrower and particular sense of: "the
understanding or cognitive faculty of the mind." Accordingly, we shall
include the cultivation of the mental activities known as Attention,
Perception, Imagination, etc., together with the strictly cognitive faculties,
under the general term of Thought-Culture.
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