YOUR MIND AND HOW TO USE IT/PART 22
CHAPTER XXII.
Classes of Concepts.
IN
the preceding chapter we have seen the process of conception—of the forming of
concepts. The idea of a general class of things or qualities is a
concept. Each concept contains the qualities which are common
to all the individuals composing the class, but not those qualities
which pertain only to the minor classes or the individuals. For instance, the
concept of "bird" will necessarily include the common qualities of
warm-bloodedness, featheredness, wingedness, oviparousness, and
vertebratedness. But it will not include color, special shape,
size, or special features or characteristics of the subfamilies or individuals
composing the great class. The class comprises the individuals and subclasses
composing it; the concept includes the general and common qualities which all in
the class possess. A percept is the mental image of a
particular thing; a concept is the mental idea of the general
qualities of a class of things. A percept arises from the perception of a
sensation; a concept is a purely mental, abstract creation, whose only
existence is in the world of ideas and which has no corresponding
individual object in the world of sense.
There
are two general classes of concepts, namely: (1) concrete concepts, in which
the common qualities of a class of things are combined into one conceptual
idea, such as "bird," of which we have spoken; (2) abstract concepts,
in which is combined the idea of some quality common to a
number of things, such as "sweetness" or "redness."
Jevons's well-known rule for terms is an aid in remembering this
classification: "A concrete term is the name of a thing; an abstract
term is the name of a quality of a thing."
It
is a peculiar fact and rule of concrete concepts that (1) the larger the class
of things embraced in a concept, the smaller are its general qualities; and (2)
the larger the number of general qualities included in a concept, the smaller
the number of individuals embraced by it. For instance, the term
"bird" embraces a great number of individuals—all the birds that are
in existence, in fact, but it has but few general qualities, as we have seen.
On the contrary, the concept "stork" has a much larger number of
general qualities, but embraces far fewer individuals. Finally, the individual
is reached, and we find that it has more qualities than any class can have; but
it is composed of the smallest possible number of individuals, one. The
secret is this: No two individuals can have as many qualities in
common as each has individually, unless they are precisely alike,
which is impossible in nature.
Imperfect
Concepts.
It
is said that outside of strictly scientific definitions very few persons agree
in their concepts of the same thing. Each has his or her own concept of the
particular thing which he or she expresses by the same term. A number of
persons asked to define a common term like "love,"
"religion," "faith," "belief," etc., will give
such a variety of answers as to cause wonderment. As Green says: "My idea
or image is mine alone—the reward of careless observation if imperfect; of
attentive, careful, and varied observation if correct. Between mine and yours a
great gulf is fixed. No man can pass from mine to yours, or from yours to mine.
Neither in any proper sense of the term can mine be conveyed to you. Words do
not convey thoughts; they are not vehicles of thoughts in any true sense of
that term. A word is simply a common symbol which each associates with his own
idea or image."
The
reason of the difference in the concepts of several persons is that very few of
our concepts are nearly perfect; the majority of them are quite imperfect and
incomplete. Jevons gives us an idea of this in his remarks on
classification: "Things may seem to be very much like each other which are
not so. Whales, porpoises, seals, and several other animals live in the sea
exactly like a fish; they have a similar shape and are usually classed among
fish. People are said to go whale fishing. Yet these animals are not really
fish at all, but are much more like dogs and horses and other quadrupeds than
they are like fish. They cannot live entirely under water and breathe the air
contained in the water like fish, but they have to come to the surface at
intervals to take breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because
they fly about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings are
not like those of birds, and, in truth, bats are much more like rats and mice
than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to classify plants
according to their size, as trees, shrubs, or herbs, but we now know that a
great tree is often more similar in character to a tiny herb than it is to
other great trees. A daisy has little resemblance to a great Scotch thistle;
yet the botanist regards them as very similar. The lofty growing bamboo is a
kind of grass, and the sugar cane also belongs to the same class with wheat and
oats."
It
is a matter of importance that clear concepts should be formed regarding at
least the familiar things of life. The list of clear concepts should be added
to from time to time by study, investigation, and examination. The dictionary
should be consulted frequently, and a term studied until one has a clear
meaning of the concept the term seeks to express. A good encyclopedia (not
necessarily an expensive one, in these days of cheap editions) will also prove
very useful in this respect. As Halleck says: "It must be borne in mind
that most of our concepts are subject to change during our entire life; that at
first they are made only in a tentative way; that experience may show us, at
any time, that they have been erroneously formed, that we have abstracted too
little or too much, made the class too wide or too narrow, or that here a
quality must be added or there one taken away."
It
is a good practice to make a memorandum of anything of which you may hear, but
of which you know nothing, and then later to make a brief but thorough
investigation of that thing, by means of the dictionary and encyclopedia, and
of whatever good works may be obtained on the subject, not leaving it until you
feel that you have obtained at least a clear idea of what the
thing really means. A half hour each evening devoted to exercise of
this kind will result in a wonderful increase of general information. We have
heard of a man who made a practice of reading a short article in the
encyclopedia every evening, giving preference to subjects generally
classed as familiar. In a year he made a noticeable advance in general
knowledge as well as habits of thought. In five years he was looked upon by his
associates as a man of a remarkably large field of general information and of
more than ordinary intelligence, which verdict was a just one. As a rule we
waste far more time on worthless fiction than we are willing to devote to a
little self-improvement of this kind. We shrink at the idea of a general course
of instructive reading, little realizing that we can take our study in small
installments and at a very little cost in time or labor.
Our
concepts form the material which our intellect uses in its reasoning processes.
No matter how good a reasoner one may be, unless he has a good supply of
general information about the things of which he is reasoning, he will not make
much real headway. We must begin at the bottom and build a firm foundation upon
which the intellectual structure may be erected. This foundation is composed
of facts. These facts are represented by our clear and correct
concepts.
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