YOUR MIND AND HOW TO USE IT/PART 29
CHAPTER XXIX.
The Will.
THE
activities of the will comprise the third great class of mental processes.
Psychologists always have differed greatly in their conception of just what
constitutes these activities. Even to-day it is difficult to obtain a
dictionary definition of the will that agrees with the best opinion on the
subject. The dictionaries adhere to the old classification and conception which
regarded the will as "that faculty of the mind or soul by which it chooses
or decides." But with the growth of the idea that the will acts according
to the strongest motive, and that the motive is supplied by the average struck
between the desires of the moment, under the supervision of the intellect, the
conception of will as the choosing and deciding faculty is passing from favor.
In the place of the older conception has come the newer one which holds that
the will is primarily concerned with action.
It
is difficult to place the will in the category of mental processes. But it is
generally agreed that it abides in the very center of the mental being, and is
closely associated with what is called the ego, or self. The will seems to
have at least three general phases, viz.: (1) The phase of desire, (2) the
phase of deliberation or choice, and (3) the phase of expression in action. In
order to understand the will, it is necessary to consider each of these three
phases of its activities.
(1). Desire.
The
first phase of will, which is called "desire," is in itself somewhat
complex. On its lower side it touches, and, in fact, blends into, feeling and
emotion. Its center consists of a state of tension, akin to that of
a coiled spring or a cat crouching ready for a spring. On its higher side it
touches, penetrates, and blends into the other phases of the will which we have
mentioned.
Desire
is defined as "a feeling, emotion, or excitement of the mind directed
toward the attainment, enjoyment, or possession of some object from which
pleasure, profit, or gratification is expected." Halleck gives us the
following excellent conception of the moving spirit of desire: "Desire
has for its object something which will bring pleasure or get rid of pain,
immediate or remote, for the individual or for some one in whom he is
interested. Aversion, or a striving away from something, is merely the negative
aspect of desire."
In
Halleck's statement, above quoted, we have the explanation of the part played
by the intellect in the activities of will. The intellect is able to perceive
the relations between present action and future results, and is able to point
the way toward the suppression of some desires in order that other and better
ones may be manifested. It also serves its purposes in regulating the
"striking of the average" between conflicting desires. Without the
intervention of the intellect, the temporary desire of the moment would invariably
be acted upon without regard to future results or consequences to one's self
and others. It also serves to point out the course of action calculated to give
the most satisfactory expression of the desire.
While
it is a fact that the action of will depends almost entirely upon the motive
force of desire, it is likewise true that desire may be created, regulated,
suppressed, and even killed by the action of the will. The will, by giving or
refusing attention to a certain class of desires, may either cause them to grow
and wax strong, or else die and fade away. It must be remembered, however, that
this use of the will itself springs from another set of desires or feelings.
Desire
is aroused by feelings or emotions rising from the subconscious planes of the
mind and seeking expression and manifestation. We have considered the nature of
the feelings and emotions in previous chapters, which should be read in
connection with the present one. It should be remembered that the feeling
or emotional side of desire arises from either inherited race memories existing
as instincts, or from the memory of the past experiences of the individual. In
some cases the feeling first manifests in a vague unrest caused by subconscious
promptings and excitement. Then the imagination pictures the object of the
feeling, or certain memory images connected with it, and the desire thus
manifests on the plane of consciousness.
The
entrance of the desire feeling into consciousness is accompanied by that
peculiar tension which marks the second phase of desire. This
tension, when sufficiently strong, passes into the third phase of desire, or
that in which desire blends into will action. Desire in this stage makes a
demand upon will for expression and action. From mere feeling, and tension of
feeling, it becomes a call to action. But before expression and
action are given to it, the second phase of will must manifest at least for a
moment; this second phase is that known as deliberation, or the weighing and
balancing of desires.
(2). Deliberation.
The
second phase of will, known as deliberation, is more than the purely
intellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays an
important part, it is true, but there is also an almost instinctive and
automatic weighing and balancing of desires. There is seldom only
one desire presenting its claims upon the will at any particular moment. It is
true that occasionally there arises an emotional desire of such dominant power
and strength that it crowds out every other claimant at the bar of
deliberation. But such instances are rare, and as a rule there are a host of
rival claimants, each insisting upon its rights in the matter at issue. In the
man of weak or undeveloped and untrained intellect, the struggle is usually
little more than a brief combat between several desires, in which the
strongest at the moment wins. But with the development of intellect new
factors arise and new forces are felt. Moreover, the more complex one's
emotional nature, and the greater the development of the higher forms of
feeling, the more intense is the struggle of deliberation or the fight of the
desires.
We
see, in Halleck's definition, that desire has not only the object of
"bringing pleasure or getting rid of pain" for the individual, but
that the additional element of the welfare of "some one in whom he is
interested" is added, which element is often the deciding factor. This
element, of course, arises from the development and cultivation of one's
emotional nature. In the same way we also see that it is not merely the immediate welfare
of one's self or those in whom one is interested that speaks before the bar,
but also the more remote welfare. This consideration of future
welfare depends upon the intellect and cultivated imagination under its control.
Moreover, the trained intellect is able to discover possible greater
satisfaction in some course of action other than in the one prompted by the
clamoring desire of the moment. This explains why the judgment and action of an
intelligent man, as a rule, are far different from those of the unintelligent
one; and also why a man of culture tends toward different action from that of
the uncultured; and likewise, why the man of broad sympathies and high ideals
acts in a different way from one of the opposite type. But the principle is
ever the same—the feelings manifest in desire, the greatest ultimate
satisfaction apparent at the moment is sought, and the strongest set of desires
wins the day.
Halleck's
comment on this point is interesting. He says: "Desire is not always
proportional to the idea of one's own selfish pleasure. Many persons, after
forming an idea of the vast amount of earthly distress, desire to relieve it,
and the desire goes out in action, as the benevolent societies in every city
testify. Here the individual pleasure is none the less, but it is secondary,
coming from the pleasure of others. The desire of the near often
raises a stronger desire than the remote. A child frequently
prefers a thing immediately if it is only one tenth as good as something he
might have a year hence. A student often desires more the leisure of to-day
than the success of future years. Though admonished to study, he wastes his
time and thus loses incomparably greater future pleasure when he is tossed to
the rear in the struggle for existence."
The
result of this weighing and balancing of the desire is, or should be, decision
and choice, which then passes into action. But many persons seem unable to
"make up their own mind," and require a push or urge from without
before they will act. Others decide, without proper use of the intellect, upon
what they call "impulse," but which is merely impatience. Some are
like the fabled donkey which starved to death when placed at an equal distance
between two equally attractive haystacks and was unable to decide towards which
to move. Others follow the example of Jeppe, in the comedy, who, when given a
coin with which to buy a piece of soap for his wife, stood on the corner
deliberating whether to obey orders or to buy a drink with the money. He wants
the drink, but realizes that his wife will beat him if he returns without the
soap. "My stomach says drink; my back says soap," says Jeppe.
"But," finally he remarks, "is not a man's stomach more to him
than his back? Yes, says I."
The
final decision depends upon the striking a balance between the desires,—the
weighing of desire for and desire against,—desire for this and desire for
something else. The strength of the several desires depends upon nearness and
present interest arising from attention, as applied to the feelings and
emotions arising from heredity, environment, experience, and education, which
constitute character; and also upon the degree of intellectual clearness and
power in forming correct judgments between the desires.
It
must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as an opponent of
the principle of the satisfaction of desire, but merely as an instrument of the
ego in determining which course of action will result in the greatest ultimate
satisfaction, direct or indirect, present or future. For, at the last,
every individual acts so as to bring himself the greatest satisfaction,
immediate or future, direct or indirect, either personal or through the welfare
of others, as this may appear to him at the particular moment of deliberation.
We always act in the direction of that which will greater "content our
spirit." This will be found to be the spirit of all decisions, although
the motive is often hidden and difficult to find even by the individual
himself, many of the strongest motives having their origin in the subconscious
planes of mentality.
(3). Action.
The
third and final phase of will is that known as action—the act of volition by
which the desire-idea is expressed in physical or mental activity. The old conception
of the will held that the decisive phase of the will was its characteristic and
final phase, ignoring the fact that the very essence or spirit of will is bound
up with action. Even those familiar with the newer conception
frequently assume that the act of decision is the final phase of will, ignoring
the fact that we frequently decide to do a thing and yet may
never carry out the intention and decision. The act of willing is not complete
unless action is expressed. There must be the manifestation of the motor
element or phase of will, else the will process is incomplete.
A
weakness of this last phase of will affects the entire will and renders its
processes ineffective. The world is filled with persons who are able to decide what
is best to do, and what should be done, but who never actually act upon
the decision. The few persons who promptly follow up the decision with vigorous
action are those who accomplish the world's work. Without the full
manifestation of this third phase of will the other two phases are useless.
Types
of Will.
So
far we have considered merely the highest type of will—that which is
accompanied by conscious deliberation, in which the intellect takes an active
part. In this process, not only do the conflicting feelings push themselves
forward with opposing claims for recognition, but the intellect is active in
examining the case and offering valuable testimony as to the comparative merits
of the various claimants and the effect of certain courses of action upon the
individual. There are, however, several lower forms of will manifestation which
we should briefly consider in passing.
Reflex
Action.—The will is moved to action by the reflex activities of the
nervous system which have been mentioned in the earlier chapters of this book.
In this general type we find unconscious reflex action, such as that manifested
when a sleeper is touched and moves away, or when the frog's leg twitches when
the nerve end is excited. We also find conscious reflex action, such as that
manifested by the winking of the eye, or the performance of habitual physical
motion, such as the movement in walking, operating the sewing machine or
typewriter, playing the piano, etc.
Impulsive
Action.—The will is often moved to action by a dim idea or faint perception
of purpose or impulse. The action is almost instinctive, although there is a
vague perception of purpose. For instance, we feel an impulse to turn toward
the source of a strange sound or sight, or other source of interest or
curiosity. Or we may feel an impulse arising from the subconscious plane of our
mind, causing a dimly-conscious idea of movement or action to relieve the
tension. For instance, one may feel a desire to exercise, or to seek fresh air
or green fields, although he had not been thinking of these things at the time.
These impulses arise from a subconscious feeling of fatigue or desire for
change, which, added to a fleeting idea, produces the impulse. Unless an
impulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired by other desires, habits,
ideas, or ideals, we act upon it in precisely the same way that a young child
or animal does. Hoffding says of this type of action: "The psychological
condition of the impulse is, that with the momentary feeling and sensation
should be combined a more or less clear idea of something which may augment the
pleasure or diminish the pain of the moment."
Instinctive
Action.—The will is frequently moved to action by an instinctive
stimulus. This form of will activity closely resembles the last mentioned form,
and often it is impossible to distinguish between the two. The activities of
the bee in building its comb and storing its honey, the work of the silkworm
and caterpillar in building their resting places, are examples of this form of
action. Indeed, even the building of the nest of the bird may be so classed. In
these cases there is an intelligent action toward a definite end, but the
animal is unconscious of that end. The experiences of the remote ancestors of
these creatures recorded their impressions upon the subconscious mind of the
species, and they are transmitted in some way to all of that species. The
nervous system of every living thing is a record cylinder of the experiences of
its early ancestors, and these cylinders tend to reproduce these impressions
upon appropriate occasions. In preceding chapters we have shown that even man
is under the influence of instinct to a greater extent than he imagines himself
to be.
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