THE ART OF LOGICAL THINKING/PART 5
CHAPTER V.
CONCEPTS AND IMAGES
As we have said, a concept cannot be imaged—cannot be
used as the subject of a mental image. This statement is perplexing to the
student who has been accustomed to the idea that every conception of the mind
is capable of being reproduced in the form of a mental image. But the
apparently paradoxical statement is seen as quite simple when a little
consideration is given to it.
For instance, you have a distinct general concept of animal.
You know what you mean when you say or think, animal. You recognize an
animal when you see one and you understand what is meant when another uses the
word in conversation. But you cannot form a mental image of the concept, animal.
Why? Because any mental image you might form would be either a picture of some
particular animal or else a composite of the qualities of several
animals. Your concept is too broad and general to allow of a composite picture
of all
animals. And, in truth, your concept is not a
picture of anything that actually
exists in one particular, but an abstract idea embracing the qualities
of all animals. It is like the algebraic x—a symbol for something that
exists, but not the thing itself.
As Brooks says: "A concept cannot be represented
by a concrete image. This is evident from its being general rather than
particular. If its color, size or shape is fixed by an image, it is no longer
general but particular." And Halleck says: "It is impossible to image
anything without giving that image individual marks. The best mental images are
so definite that a picture could be painted from them. A being might come under
the class man and have a snub nose, blonde hair, scanty eyebrows, and no scar
on his face. The presence of one of these individual peculiarities in the
concept man would destroy it. If we form an image of an apple, it must be
either of a yellow, red, green, or russet apple, either as large as a pippin or
as small as a crab-apple. A boy was asked what he thought of when 'apple'
was mentioned. He replied that he thought of 'a big, dark-red, apple with a bad
spot on one side, near the top.' That boy could image distinctly, but his power
of forming concepts was still in its infancy."
So we see that while a mental image must picture the
particular and individual qualities, properties and appearances of some
particular unit of a class, a concept can and must contain only the class
qualities—that is, the qualities belonging to the entire class. The
general concept is as has been said "a general idea ... a general notion
which has in it all that is common to its own class." And it follows that
a "general idea" of this kind cannot be pictured. A picture must be
of some particular thing, while a concept is something above and higher than
particular things. We may picture a man, but we cannot picture Man the concept of
the race. A concept is not a reproduction of the image of a thing,
but on the contrary is an idea of
a class of things. We trust
that the student will consider this point until he arrives at a clear
understanding of the distinction, and the reason thereof.
But, while a concept is incapable of being pictured
mentally as an image, it is true that some particular
representative of a class may
be held in the mind or imagination as an idealized object, as a general representative
of the class, when we speak or think of the general term or concept, providing
that its real relation to the concept is recognized. These idealized objects,
however, are not concepts—they are percepts reproduced by the memory. It is
important, however, to all who wish to convey their thought plainly, that they
be able to convert their concepts into idealized representative objects.
Otherwise, they tend to become too idealistic and abstract for common
comprehension. As Halleck well says: "We should in all cases be ready to
translate our concepts, when occasion requires, into the images of those
individuals which the concept represents. A concept means nothing except in
reference to certain individuals. Without them it could never have had
existence and they are entitled to representation. A man who cannot translate
his concepts into definite images of the proper objects, is fitted neither to
teach, preach, nor practice any profession.... There was, not long ago, a man
very fond of talking about fruit in the abstract; but he failed to
recognize an individual cranberry when it was placed before him. A humorist
remarked that a certain metaphysician had such a love for abstractions, and
such an intense dislike for concrete things, as to refuse to eat a concrete
peach when placed before him."
In the beginning many students are perplexed
regarding the difference between a percept and a concept. The distinction is
simple when properly considered. A percept is: "the object of an act of
perception; that which is perceived." A concept is: "a mental
representation." Brooks makes the following distinction: "A percept
is the mental product of a real thing; a concept is a mere idea or
notion of the common attributes of things. A percept represents some
particular object; a concept is not particular, but general. A percept
can be described by particulars; a concept can be described only by generals. The
former can usually be represented by an image, the latter cannot be imagined, it can only
be thought." Thus one is able to image the percept of a
particular horse which has been perceived; but he is unable to image correctly
the concept of horse as a class or generic term.
In connection with this distinction between perception
and conception,
we may as well consider the subject of apperception, a term favored
by many modern psychologists, although others steadfastly decline to recognize
its necessity or meaning and refuse to employ it. Apperception may be defined
as: "perception accompanied by comprehension; perception accompanied by
recognition." The thing perceived is held to be comprehended or recognized—
that is, perceived in a new sense, by reason of certain previously acquired
ideas in the mind. Halleck explains it as: "the perception of things in
relation to the ideas which we already possess." It follows that all
individuals possessed of equally active organs of perception, and equally
active attention, will perceive the same thing in the same way and in the same
degree. But the apperception of each individual will differ and vary
according to his previous experience and training, temperament and taste, habit
and custom. For instance, the familiar story of the boy who climbed a tree and
watched the passers-by, noting their comments. The first passer-by noticing the
tree, says aloud: "That would make a good stick of timber."
"Good morning, Mr. Carpenter," said the boy. The next man said: "That
tree has fine bark." "Good morning, Mr. Tanner," said the boy.
Another said, "I bet there's a squirrel's nest up in that tree."
"Good morning, Mr. Hunter," said the boy.
The woman sees in a bird something pretty and
"cunning." The hunter sees in it something to kill. The ornithologist
sees it as something of a certain genus and species, and perhaps also as
something appropriate for his collection. The farmer perceives it to be
something destructive of either insects or crops. A thief sees a jail as
something to be dreaded; an ordinary citizen, something useful for confining
objectionable people; a policeman, something in the line of his business. And
so on, the apperception differing upon the previous experience of the
individual. In the same way the scientist sees in an animal or rock many
qualities of which the ordinary person is ignorant. Our training, experience,
prejudices, etc., affect our apperception.
And so, we see that in a measure our concepts
are determined not only by our simple perceptions, but also materially by our
apperceptions. We conceive things not only as they are apparent to our senses,
but also as colored and influenced by our previous impressions and ideas. For
this reason we find widely varying concepts of the same things among different
individuals. Only an absolute mind could form an absolute concept.
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